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THROUGH A GLASS, DARKLY
Some Reflections on the Future of War
Martin van Creveld
The purpose of this article is to offer a brief, late-twentieth-century account ofwhat has happened to war during the last millennium and where it may be going
in the near future. To this end, the article is divided into four parts. The first provides a
very brief outline of the development of major war from about A.D. 1000 to 1945. The
next part explains how that development was affected, not to say interrupted, by the
introduction of nuclear weapons. The third part shows how, even as major war began
to retreat and wane, the period since 1945 has witnessed the growth of forms of war
that are simultaneously old and new and that now threaten to take over many coun-
tries all over the planet.Finally,we conclude with observations on the consequences of
all this for the future of air forces, navies, armies, and even war itself.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF WAR, 1000–1945
Looking back, the outstanding characteristic of war
since A.D. 1000 or so has been its progressive consolida-
tion.1 As might be expected, this consolidation took
place more or less simultaneously in all possible fields:
namely the political, the economic, military, and the
technological. The following paragraphs will attempt to
provide an outline, however brief, of the main develop-
ments in each of those four spheres.
First, the political: In A.D. 1000, Western, Central, and
Northern Europe were divided into thousands, if not
tens of thousands, of small political organizations. Most
of the organizations in question were secular, but others
were ecclesiastical. Most were of the type known as
Martin van Creveld, born in the Netherlands, has lived in
Israel since 1950. He holds degrees from the London School
of Economics and The Hebrew University in Jerusalem,
where he has been on the faculty since 1971. He is the au-
thor of fifteen books on military history and strategy, of
which Command in War (1985), Supplying War (1977),
and The Sword and the Olive (1998) are among the best
known. Professor van Creveld has lectured or taught at vir-
tually every strategic institute, military or civilian, in the
Western world—including the U.S. Naval War College,
most recently in December 1999 and January 2000.
This article is based upon a paper delivered to a confer-
ence on “alternative futures” at the Naval War College
in January 2000; an earlier version was submitted to
the Bundesakademie fuer Sicherheitspolitik in Berlin
in September 1999.
© 2000 by Martin van Creveld
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2000, Vol. LIII, No. 4
1
van Creveld: Through a Glass, Darkly
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2000
feudal, but some (particularly in the relatively undeveloped north) belonged to
an older type that is best characterized as tribal. Still others consisted of urban
communities that, resting upon various legal principles, contained within
themselves the seeds of future political power.2 To one extent or another, all had
this in common: they possessed the legal right to defend themselves, weapon in
hand. This right they exercised by setting up and maintaining armed forces of some
kind, be they retainers, feudal warriors, or mercenaries; by manufacturing or pur-
chasing defensive and offensive arms; and, the most visible symbol of all, by build-
ing fortified walls, of which they were often inordinately proud.
For reasons beyond the scope of the present article, the number of political
units that possessed the right and the ability to wage war tended to decline over
the centuries. To be sure, the process was not unilineal, nor did it proceed with
equal speed during all periods and in all countries. There were many ups and
downs, particularly in France during the Hundred Years’ War, which was as
much a civil conflict as it was a war with England. The same was true of England
during the so-called Wars of the Roses, and of Germany during the Thirty Years’
War. Nevertheless, the direction of development appears clear in retrospect.
Some political organizations developed into big fish and, swallowing others, ex-
panded. Others were fated to serve as bait and, having been swallowed, disap-
peared. Some acquired the quality known as “sovereignty,” whereas the majority
lost it.3 The number of war-making political units decreased, and the power of
the remaining ones increased.
Again for reasons that cannot be explored here, the most important agglom-
erations of power appeared in Europe;4 indeed, such was the discrepancy in
power between European-type states and the political organizations that
formed themselves on other continents that by the late nineteenth century the
former were capable of taking over most of the remaining world almost as an
afterthought.
The process of political consolidation was supported by, and in turn sup-
ported, growing economic power. Even during the late Middle Ages, feudal
lords, kings, and even emperors were not necessarily much richer than their vas-
sals—one remembers, for instance, how Emperor Maximilian died penniless
(during the last days of his life, no inn could be found that would lodge him and
his followers) and how Charles V’s election was brought about by the money
provided by the Fuggers family. Later, the situation changed. In England, Henry
VIII, having changed his religion and confiscated church lands, was able to in-
crease his revenue by a factor of three and thus become the first monarch who
was richer than all his lords put together; in France, between 1523 and 1600 the
royal income quadrupled.5 Once the Thirty Years’ War had ended, the economic
power first of rulers and then of states vis-à-vis their own subjects continued to
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grow. By the second half of the eighteenth century, the personal resources of
even the monarchs themselves were being dwarfed by those of the political orga-
nizations over which they ruled.6
The industrial revolution that began in England around 1750, the transport
revolution that followed it, and the communications revolution that accompa-
nied helped reinforce these trends. Throughout the nineteenth century, the eco-
nomic power of the state grew and
grew; not only that, but the first suc-
cessful experiments were being
made to decouple money itself from
bullion and turn it into a state-man-
ufactured commodity.7 By the time World War I broke out, states had become
richer and more powerful than ever.
Thanks to new administrative techniques, such as the systematic registration
of entire populations and the collection of statistics of every kind, states were
also in a position to take away as much as 85 percent of their citizens’ wealth for
the purpose of making war—a figure never thereafter surpassed, though not in-
frequently approached.8 To provide a contemporary example, Microsoft’s Bill
Gates, with a hundred billion dollars at his command, is reputed to be the richest
man who ever lived.9 Still, his business empire is dwarfed by the U.S. govern-
ment, the annual budget of which is on the order of two trillion dollars, and the
assets of which, built up over many generations and including everything not
owned by private individuals and corporations, are simply impossible to
calculate.
Expanding political and economic power provided the foundation for a cor-
responding growth in military might. During the Middle Ages, hardly any terri-
torial lords were, and not a single city was, in a position to raise more than a few
thousand troops. The majority had to content themselves with far fewer; not sel-
dom, the contingents that they sent to their lords’ aid numbered in the hundreds
or even the mere dozens. By the middle of the sixteenth century, the most im-
portant armed forces, now consisting mainly of mercenaries rather than feudal
warriors or urban levies, already numbered in the tens of thousands. By the
eighteenth century the forces had grown into the low hundreds of thousands.
These forces, moreover, consisted of long-service regulars. Consequently, they
were now available not only in war but in times of peace as well.
During the years between 1793 and 1815, following the declaration of the
levée en masse by the French National Assembly and the subsequent adoption of
the principle by other countries as well, the expansion of armed forces contin-
ued. After the battle of Waterloo there was a temporary return to professional
armies, and growth tended to level off, only to be resumed after 1860 or so. By
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this time it was supported by the railways and the telegraphs, the twin instru-
ments that made it possible to mobilize hundreds of thousands of people. It cul-
minated during the period 1914–39, when the main belligerents called up
between them over a hundred million men (as against perhaps two million
women), put them into uniform, armed them, trained them, and sent them to
slaughter each other on battlefields that stretched from Leningrad to El
Alamein, and from the North Atlantic to the South Pacific.10
Finally, the enormous growth in the political-economic-military power of
the state could never have taken place without corresponding technological
progress, both military and civilian.11 To focus on the main developments only,
from A.D. 1000 to 1945, the tank replaced the horse as the most powerful weapon
on land. At sea, the size of capital ships grew from perhaps a hundred tons to as
much as fifty thousand tons; entire media, notably the deep sea and the air, were
invaded for the first time, by means of the submarine and the aircraft, respec-
tively. Many of the most important developments of this era took place during
the period of the industrial revolution, specifically during the twentieth century,
but others, such as gunpowder, firearms, and the full-rigged sailing man-of-war,
came earlier. All made possible vast increases not only in the power of weapons
but in speed, range, rates of fire, and accuracy; in turn, they were supported by
vast advances in such fields as communication, transportation, and production.
The climax of these developments was reached during the era of the world
wars, above all World War II. Seven mighty states, the least of which had a popu-
lation of approximately forty-five million people, battled each other for six years
on end; the Soviet Union alone called up almost thirty-five million men.12 Ser-
vicemen in that conflict were armed with literally hundreds of thousands of heavy
war machines—guns, tanks, aircraft—and manned thousands upon thousands of
naval vessels of all sorts. Waging “total war” against each other, the states undertook
operations so large and so ferocious that in the end, forty to sixty million people
were dead, and the best part of a continent lay in ruins. Then, dropping out of a clear
sky on 6 August 1945, came the first atomic bomb, changing everything forever.
THE IMPACT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Whereas during the thousand years before 1945, the size of war had grown and
grown, after that year the trend reversed itself. From the beginning of history,
political organizations going to war against each other could hope to preserve
themselves by defeating the enemy and gaining a victory; now, assuming only
that the vanquished side retained a handful of deliverable weapons ready for use,
the link between victory and self-preservation had been cut. On the contrary, at
least the possibility had now to be taken into account that the greater the
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triumph gained over an opponent who was in possession of nuclear weapons,
the greater the danger to the survival of the victor.13
Appearing as they did at the end of the largest armed conflict ever waged, it
was a long time before the stultifying effects of nuclear weapons on future war
were realized. During the immediate post-1945 years, only one important au-
thor seems to have understood that “the absolute weapons” could never be
used;14 whether in or out of uniform, the great majority preferred to look for
ways in which the weapons could, and if necessary would, be used.15 As is always
the case in human affairs, inertia and “lessons” (in this case, of World War II)
played a part. So long as the number of available nuclear weapons remained lim-
ited, their power small (compared to what was to come later), and their effects ill
understood, it was possible to believe that they would make but little difference.
To the people who had gone through the world war and whose job it was to look
into the future, the outstanding characteristic of twentieth-century “total” war-
fare had been the state’s ability to mobilize massive resources and use them for
creating and deploying equally massive armed forces.16 Hence it was not unnatu-
ral to assume that similar resources, minus of course those destroyed by the oc-
casional atomic bomb, would continue to be thrown into combat.17
At first, possession of nuclear weapons was confined to one country only, the
United States, which used them to end the war against Japan. However, the
“atomic secret” could not be kept for very long; in September 1949, five years
earlier than the West had expected, the USSR carried out its first test.18 There
were now two states capable of inflicting “unacceptable damage” on each other,
as the phrase went. More and more weapons were produced. The introduction of
hydrogen bombs in 1952–53 opened up the vision of unlimited destructive power
(the most powerful one built had about three thousand times the destructive force
of the fission weapon that had demolished Hiroshima) and made the prospect of
nuclear war between the superpowers even more awful. At the end of World War
II there had been just two bombs in existence; now the age of nuclear plenty ar-
rived, with more than enough “devices” to “service” any conceivable target.19
To focus on the United States alone, the number of available weapons rose
from perhaps less than a hundred in 1950 to some three thousand in 1960, by
which time each Hiroshima-sized target on the other side of the Iron Curtain
was being targeted by fifty times the explosive power that had destroyed that un-
fortunate city. There were ten thousand warheads in 1970 and as many as thirty
thousand in the early 1980s, when, more for lack of suitable targets than any
other reason, the expansion of the arsenal was brought to a halt. The size of the
weapons probably ranged from under one kiloton (that is, a thousand tons of
TNT, the most powerful conventional explosive) to as much as fifteen megatons
(fifteen million tons of TNT); because the introduction of new computers and
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other navigation aids as time went on permitted more accurate delivery vehicles
to be built, there was a tendency in the United States for the yields of “strategic”
warheads to decline, from the megaton range to as little as from fifty to 150 kilo-
tons. With some variations, notably a preference for larger warheads and a
greater reliance on land-based delivery vehicles as opposed to air and sea-based
ones, these arrangements were duplicated on the other side of the Iron Curtain.
At its peak during the mid-eighties, the Soviet arsenal probably counted some
twenty thousand warheads and their delivery vehicles.
By basing them on the ground, at sea, and in the air, as well as greatly increas-
ing their numbers, the superpowers could protect the nuclear forces themselves
against attack, at any rate enough to deliver the so-called “second strike.” How-
ever, the same was not true of industrial, urban, and demographic targets on
both sides of the Iron Curtain. Dur-
ing World War II, a defense that re-
lied on radar and combined fighters
with antiaircraft artillery had some-
times brought down as many as a
quarter of the bombers attacking a target (for example, in the American raid
against Schweinfurt in 1943). Should an attack be made with nuclear weapons,
though, a defense capable of shooting down even 90 percent of the attacking air-
craft would be of no avail. A single bomber getting through would destroy the
target just as surely as Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been, to say nothing of the
damage that radiation, fallout, and electromagnetic pulse were capable of doing
to entire geographic regions.
In the absence of a defense capable of effectively protecting demographic,
economic, and industrial targets, nuclear weapons presented policy makers with
a dilemma without precedent in history. Obviously, one of the weapons’ most
important functions—some would say their only rightful function—was to de-
ter war from breaking out. Not considering deterrence to be part of war, previ-
ous military theorists (with Clausewitz at their head) had seldom even bothered
to mention it; now, however, it became a central part of “strategy,” and entire li-
braries were devoted to it. On the other hand, if the weapons and their delivery
vehicles were to be capable of deterring an aggressor, they had to be capable of
being put to use if necessary. What was more, they had to be employable in what
came to be called a “credible” manner—one that would not automatically lead
to all-out war and thus to the user’s own annihilation in a nuclear holocaust.
The West, owing to the numerical inferiority of its conventional forces, be-
lieved it might be constrained to make “first use” of its nuclear arsenal. The
search for an answer to this problem started during the mid-1950s, when it be-
came clear that the Soviet Union would not be left behind in the arms race. The
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search went on for the next thirty years, involving very large numbers of analysts
in government, the military, and various think tanks. Of the numerous theories
they proposed, not a single one ever showed the slightest promise of achieving
its goal. Meanwhile, however, a series of acute confrontations culminating in the
Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 caused the superpowers to become notably
more cautious. There followed such agreements as the Test Ban Treaty (1963),
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (1969), the two Strategic Arms Limitation
Treaties of 1972 and 1977, and the cuts in medium-range missiles and warheads
that were achieved in the late eighties by President Ronald Reagan and Chair-
man Mikhail Gorbachev. Needless to say, each agreement was brought about un-
der specific circumstances and reflected the problems of the moment. All,
however, reflected the two sides’ willingness to put a cap on the arms race, as well
as the growing conviction that should a nuclear war break out, there would be
neither winners nor losers.
By the time the Cold War came to an end, the number of nuclear states, origi-
nally just one, had reached at least eight. From Argentina and Brazil through
Canada, Western and Eastern Europe, all the way to Taiwan, Korea (both North
and South), Japan, Australia, and probably New Zealand, several dozen others
were prepared to construct bombs quickly; at any rate, they were capable of do-
ing so if they put their minds to it.20 One nation, South Africa, preened itself on
having built nuclear weapons and then dismantled them—although, under-
standably, both the meaning of “dismantling” and the fate of the dismantled
parts remain somewhat obscure.
The entry of new members into the nuclear club was not, of course, favorably
received by those who were already in it. Seeking to preserve their monopoly, the
latter repeatedly expressed their fears of the dire consequences that would follow
any expansion. Their objective was to prove that they themselves were stable and
responsible and wanted nothing but peace—and that, whether for ideological,
political, cultural, or technical reasons, this was not the case elsewhere.21 Some
international safeguards, such as the Nonproliferation Treaty and the London
Regime of 1977, were set up to prevent sensitive technology from falling into un-
desirable hands—which in practice meant those of third-world countries. How-
ever, the spread of nuclear technology proved difficult to stop. If, at present, the
number of states with nuclear weapons in their arsenals remains limited to
eight, on the whole this is due less to a lack of capability than to a lack of will on
the part of potential proliferators.
The time since the Soviet Union tested its first atom bomb suggests that the
fears of nuclear proliferation proved to be greatly exaggerated. Instead of leading
to war, let alone nuclear war, the world’s nuclear arsenals have tended to inhibit
military operations. Nor has the effect been limited to nuclear war only. Instead,
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the fear of escalation has become stronger with the passage of time, with the re-
sult that nuclear countries and their major allies were progressively less able to
fight each other directly, seriously, or on any scale. Today, in fact, a strong case
could be made that wherever nuclear weapons have appeared or their presence is
even strongly suspected, major interstate warfare on any scale is slowly abolish-
ing itself. What is more, as we have noted, any state of any importance is now by
definition capable of producing nuclear weapons. Hence, such warfare can only be
waged either between or against technologically third and fourth-echelon countries.22
Since 1945 first and second-order military powers have found it increasingly
difficult to fight each other, so it is no wonder that, taking a global view, both the
size of armed forces and the quantity of weapons at their disposal have declined
quite sharply. In 1939 France, Germany, Italy, the USSR, and Japan each pos-
sessed ready-to-mobilize forces numbering several million men. The all-time
peak came in 1944–45, when the six main belligerents (Italy having dropped out
in 1943) between them maintained some forty to forty-five million men under
arms. Since then the world’s population has almost tripled, as has the number of
states, and international relations have been anything but peaceful; during over
forty years of Cold War, one “crisis” followed another. Yet the size of regular
forces fielded by the most important states has declined.23
To adduce a more specific example, in 1941 the German invasion of the
USSR—the largest single military operation of all time—made use of 144 divi-
sions out of the approximately 209 that the Wehrmacht possessed; the forces
later deployed on the Eastern Front by both sides, particularly the Soviets, were
even larger. By contrast, since 1945 there has probably not been even one case in
which any state has used over twenty full-size divisions on any single campaign,
and the numbers are still going nowhere but down. In 1991, a coalition that in-
cluded three out of five members in the UN Security Council brought some five
hundred thousand troops to bear against Iraq; that was only about a third of
what Germany used—counting field forces only—to invade France as long ago
as 1914. As of the late nineties, the only states that still maintained forces exceed-
ing a million and a half were India and China—and of these, the latter has an-
nounced that half a million men are to be sent home. What is more, the forces of
both countries consist mainly of low-quality infantry, some of which, armed with
World War I rifles, are more suitable for maintaining internal security than for wag-
ing serious, external war.
While the decline in the number of regular troops—both regulars and, espe-
cially, reservists—has been sharp indeed, the fall in the number of major weap-
ons and weapon systems has been even more precipitous. In 1939, the air forces
of each of the leading powers counted their planes in the thousands; during each
of the years 1942–45, the United States alone produced seventy-five thousand
3 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
8
Naval War College Review, Vol. 53 [2000], No. 4, Art. 4
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol53/iss4/4
military aircraft on average. Fifty years later, the air forces of virtually all the
most important countries were shrinking fast. The largest one, the U.S. Air
Force, bought exactly 127 aircraft in 1995, including helicopters and trans-
ports;24 elsewhere, the numbers were down to the low dozens, or nil. At sea, the
story has been similar. Of the former Soviet navy, built by Admiral Sergei
Gorshkov in order to project the power of the state, little remains but rusting
surface vessels and old, poorly maintained submarines that allegedly are liable to
leak nuclear material into the sea. The U.S. Navy is in a much better state, but it
has seen the number of aircraft carriers—the most important of its weapon sys-
tems, around which everything else
revolves—go down from almost a
hundred in 1945 to as few as twelve
in 1995. The United States apart, the
one country that still maintains even
one carrier capable of launching
conventional fixed-wing combat aircraft is France. That aside, the carriers (all of
them decidedly second rate) owned by all other states combined can be counted
on the fingers of one hand. Indeed, it is true to say that with a single major excep-
tion, states no longer maintain oceangoing navies at all—and even the excep-
tion, the largest navy of all, that of the United States, has been cut by almost half
since the late eighties.
In part, this decline in the size of armed forces reflects the escalating cost of
modern weapons and weapon systems.25 A World War II fighter-bomber could
be had for approximately fifty thousand dollars. Some of its modern successors,
such as the F-15, come at a hundred million dollars apiece, when their mainte-
nance packages (without which they would not be operational) are included;
that, even when inflation is taken into account, represents a thousandfold in-
crease. Even this does not mark the limit on what some airborne weapon systems,
such as the “stealth” bomber, AWACS, and J-STARS—all of them produced,
owned, and operated exclusively by the world’s sole remaining superpower—can
cost. It has even been claimed that the reluctance of the U.S. Air Force to use its
most recent acquisition, the two-billion-dollar B-2 bomber, against Iraq
stemmed from the absence of targets worthy of the risk;26 should one be shot
down or lost by accident, the storm of criticism would be hard to withstand.
Even so, one should not make too much of the price factor. Modern econo-
mies are extraordinarily productive. As the histories of both world wars show,
they could certainly devote much greater resources to the acquisition of military
hardware than they do at present. Thus, the cost of modern weapon systems may
appear exorbitant only because the state’s basic security, safeguarded as it is by
nuclear weapons and their ever-ready delivery vehicles, no longer appears
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sufficiently at risk to justify them. In fact, this is probably the correct interpreta-
tion; it is supported by the tendency, which has now been evident for decades, to
cut the size of any production program and to stretch the length of any acquisi-
tion process almost indefinitely. For example, to develop the Manhattan Pro-
ject—which besides the application of revolutionary physical science included
the construction of the largest industrial plant ever built up to that time—and
build the first atomic bombs took less than three years; nonetheless, the design-
ers of present-day conventional weapon systems want us to believe that a new
fighter-bomber cannot advance from drawing board to deployment in less than
fifteen. The development histories of countless modern weapon systems prove
that usually only a fraction of the numbers initially required are produced, and
then only after delays of years.27 The reason is that in most cases by the time the
system can be fielded, the threat—which would have made rapid mass produc-
tion necessary and, incidentally, have led to a dramatic drop in per-unit cost—is
no longer there.
Yet another explanation for the decline in the quantity of weapons produced
and deployed is the very great improvement in quality; this, it is argued, makes
yesterday’s large numbers superfluous.28 There is in fact some truth in this argu-
ment. Especially since precision guided munitions have replaced ballistic weap-
ons in the form of the older artillery and rockets, the number of rounds
necessary to destroy any particular target has dropped very sharply; as the 1991
Gulf War and the 1999 air campaign against Serbia showed, in many applica-
tions a one-shot, one-kill capability has been achieved. Thus a single mission
flown by a fighter-bomber is said to be capable of inflicting an amount of de-
struction that once required hundreds, if not thousands, of such sorties.
On the other hand, it should be remembered that for every modern
weapon—nuclear ones only excepted—a counter may be, and in most cases has
been, designed. However simple or sophisticated two opposing military systems
may be, if they are approximately equal in technological terms the struggle be-
tween them is likely to be prolonged and result in heavy mutual attrition.29 Ex-
pecting as they did more accurate weapons to increase such attrition—as in fact
was the case both in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the 1982 Falklands War, each
in its time the most modern conflict in history—late-twentieth-century states
ought logically to have produced and fielded more weapons, not less. The fact
that this did not happen almost certainly shows that states were no longer either
willing or able to prepare for wars on a scale larger than, say, Vietnam and Af-
ghanistan; even those two conflicts came close to bankrupting the two largest
powers, the United States and the USSR respectively.
To look at it in yet another way, during World War II the capitals of four out of
seven (five out of eight, if China is included) major belligerents were occupied
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by the enemy, and two more (London and Moscow) were heavily bombed. Only
one (Washington, D.C.) escaped destruction of any kind. Since then, no first or
second-tier power has seen large-scale military operations waged on its terri-
tory; the reasons for this are obvious. In fact, the majority of countries that have
gone to war—or against which others have gone to war—have been quite small
and relatively unimportant. In this period, Israel fought against the various Arab
states; Iran against Iraq; the United States first against North Korea, then against
North Vietnam, and then against Iraq; Peru against Ecuador (before the two
states decided to resolve their differences by making the disputed territory a na-
tional park); and, for two months in 1999, “the most powerful alliance in his-
tory”against Serbia. Conversely, when the countries in question have not been
unimportant, as in the recent case of India and Pakistan, military operations
have invariably been confined to border incidents, never even coming near
the capitals.
As the twentieth century approached its end, major interstate wars appeared
to be on the retreat. In terms of numbers, they were becoming quite rare;30 in
terms of size, neither the armed forces that they involved, the magnitude of the
military operations they witnessed, nor (in almost all cases) the threat that they
posed to the belligerents’ existences even approached pre-1945 dimensions.
From the Middle East to the Straits of Taiwan, the world remains a dangerous
place, and new forms of armed conflict appear to be taking the place of the old.31
Nevertheless, compared to the situation as it existed even as late as 1939, the
change has been momentous.
THE RISE OF INTRASTATE WAR
While the proliferation of nuclear weapons appeared to put an end to major war
between major states, war as such not only did not disappear but began to be
supplemented by a different kind of armed conflict, one that, as these lines are
being written early in 2000, has already to a large extent replaced the old.
Perhaps the best way to approach the problem is this. From the middle of the
seventeenth century until 1914, the armed forces of “civilized” govern-
ments—primarily those of Europe, but later North American and Japanese ones
as well—were more than a match for whatever could be put up against them by
either societies of their own kind or others in different parts of the globe. Over
time this advantage tended to grow; the greatest discrepancy was probably
reached toward the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth
centuries. Thus, the “scramble for Africa” engaged only a few thousand Europe-
ans; at Omdurman in 1896, a handful of Maxim guns enabled the British to wipe
out entire columns of dervishes as if by magic.
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During the years 1918–39, the difficulties that the various European powers
experienced in trying to hold on to the various colonial empires increased ap-
preciably. In some places, such as the Sahara, it took years and tens of thousands
of troops to put an end to uprisings; in others the imperialists were compelled to
forge alliances with local elites, which were then co-opted into the lower eche-
lons of government. Frequently the Europeans hid behind a variety of treaties
that conceded the appearance of power while preserving the reality; that was the
case throughout the Middle East and also, to a growing extent, in India. Still,
while the direction of change was quite clear, its extent should not be exagger-
ated. When World War II broke out in 1939, not a single Asian or African coun-
try had yet rid itself of its real masters—in other words, troops that were either
white or organized and run by whites.
In the event, perhaps the first to find out that the nature of war had begun to
change were the Germans. During the last years of the nineteenth century the
Germans had participated in the scramble for Africa, gaining territories and
holding them by means that were as ferocious as those employed by anybody
else. Having lost their empire in the wake of World War I, during World War II
they found renewed occasion to show their prowess in counterinsurgency cam-
paigns. Beginning already in 1941, and steadily more so thereafter, the German
occupations of Yugoslavia and Russia in particular were so ruthless as to resem-
ble genocide; yet even these methods did not lead to peace and quiet. On the
contrary, the greater the atrocities the occupiers committed, the fiercer, by and
large, the resistance they encountered. Some countries and some populations
were slower off the mark than others, but resistance spread to virtually every na-
tion that was held by the Germans; by the second half of 1944, much of occupied
Europe was ablaze.
The Germans soon discovered that it was precisely the most modern compo-
nents of their armed forces that were of the least use. Hitherto their tanks, artil-
lery, fighters, and bombers had experienced little difficulty in tearing to pieces
the rest of the world’s most advanced armies—including those of three world
powers with combined forces considerably larger than their own;32 now, how-
ever, confronted by small groups of guerrillas who did not constitute armies, did
not wear uniforms, did not fight in the open, and tended to melt away into the
countryside or surrounding populations, they found themselves almost entirely
at a loss. Like other conquerors after them, the Germans learned that for coun-
terinsurgency purposes, almost the only forces that mattered were those that
were lightly armed—police, light infantry, mountaineers, special forces, signals
units, and above all, intelligence personnel of every kind. All had to operate on
foot or travel in light vehicles. Outside the towns they could be reinforced by re-
connaissance aircraft, and on such comparatively rare occasions that the
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opposition allowed itself to be caught in strength, by small detachments of artil-
lery and tanks. There was no room in these operations for the Wehrmacht’s
pride and joy, its armored and mechanized divisions—indeed, since the scale of
these operations was usually very small, for any divisions at all.
The discovery made by the Germans—and to a lesser but still significant ex-
tent, their Japanese counterparts—during World War II was later shared by vir-
tually every other major armed force. Among the first to encounter guerrilla
warfare during the immediate postwar years were the French and the British. In
point of ruthlessness, their operations were very far from matching those of the
Germans; still, particularly in the case of the French in Indochina and Algeria,
they were ruthless enough. The French attempts, supported by every modern
weapon they could bring to bear, to regain control of the colonies led to the
deaths of hundreds of thousands and the destruction by fire and sword of entire
villages, even districts. The British did not go as far; the largest number of native
victims in any of their colonial campaigns seems to have stood at ten thousand
(in Kenya); nonetheless, they too made routine use of capital punishment, tor-
ture, and the uprooting of entire villages.33 Like the Germans, the British and the
French armed forces learned that their most powerful weapons were worthless in
such warfare. Against enemies so dispersed and so elusive that they could barely be
found, the most powerful weapons of all, nuclear ones, were simply irrelevant.
Thereafter, the Dutch, Belgians, Spanish, and Portuguese were all forced to
evacuate their colonies. The Americans, seeking to take the place of the suppos-
edly demoralized French in Vietnam, sent first advisers, then special forces, and
from 1965 on, huge conventional forces into that small, backward, and remote
country.34 Eventually the total number of Americans who served there exceeded
2.5 million, and the troops present in Southeast Asia numbered at one point in
excess of 550,000. They were backed up by the most powerful military technol-
ogy available, including heavy bombers, fighter-bombers, aircraft carriers, heli-
copters (the number of helicopters lost reached 1,500), tanks, artillery, and the
most advanced communications system in history. The number of Viet Cong,
North Vietnamese, and civilian dead probably stood at between one and two
million. All to no avail—after eight years of fighting and fifty-five thousand
dead, the Americans gave up.
From Afghanistan (where the Soviet army was broken after eight years of
fighting) through Cambodia (where the Vietnamese were forced to retreat) and
Sri Lanka (which the Indian army failed to bring to order) to Namibia (granted
its independence by South Africa after a long and bitter struggle) to Eritrea
(which won its independence against everything that the Ethiopians, supported
by the USSR, could do) and to Somalia (evacuated by most United Nations
forces after their failure to deal with the local warlords), the story was always the
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same. Each time modern (more or less), heavily armed, regular, state-owned
forces took on insurgencies, they were defeated.
The above examples could easily be reinforced by many others. They show
that from 1945 on, the vast majority of the larger guerrilla and terrorist cam-
paigns in particular have been waged in third-world countries—where people
were either trying to form states of their own or where established states had
failed to assert monopolies over violence. Still, it would not be true to say that
the developed countries have remained immune to terrorism or that the prob-
lem does not exist within them. Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Britain, even Ja-
pan—where Tokyo in 1995 witnessed two deadly poison-gas attacks—have
witnessed terrorist acts on their ter-
ritories. Often the attacks have been
deadly, with dozens, even hundreds,
killed or wounded; the number of
people killed by, or in operations
against, the Irish Republican Army
stood at three thousand in early 1996, before the organization wounded two hun-
dred in a single explosion (in Manchester) in May of that year. In these and other
countries, the list of people and targets attacked includes prominent politicians, rail-
way stations, railway tracks, buses, hospitals, shopping centers, office blocks, hotels,
beer gardens, airports, aircraft in flight, ships, and of course foreign embassies and
diplomatic personnel.
Some of the attacks have represented spillovers from struggles that were tak-
ing place in other countries. For instance, Kurds fought Turks on German and
Swiss territory, and Palestinian guerrillas and Israeli secret agents chased each
other in places as remote from the Mideast as northern Norway and Latin Amer-
ica. In other incidents the terrorists, though probably not without foreign con-
nections, have been native born or at least native bred. Good examples are the
late German and Italian Red Army Factions, which maintained ties with each
other; the IRA, with its links to the United States and Libya; ETA (representing
the Basques) in Spain and France; and the various Moslem organizations that
have been operating in France and that in early 1996 made Paris look like a for-
tress. Often they are rooted in the ethnic minorities that, whether legally or not,
have entered the countries in question—in France, Germany, and Britain to-
gether there are now approximately ten million persons whose faith is Islam.
If only because they have to make a living, terrorist organizations are likely to
engage in ancillary criminal activities like drug smuggling, arms trading, and,
from the early nineties on, dealing in radioactive materials, such as uranium and
plutonium. They have proven repeatedly that they are capable of commanding
fierce loyalties; in the Middle East and Turkey, it has not been very difficult to
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find even people willing to commit suicide (and go to heaven as their reward).
The attacks by foreign-bred terrorists on the World Trade Center in New York in
1993 and by native ones on the federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995
showed that not even the two largest oceans on earth can protect a country
against terrorists—with the result that at the Atlanta Olympic Games, security
officers outnumbered athletes two to one.35
From Washington’s White House to London’s Downing Street, changes have
taken place that are obvious even to the casual tourist. Entire city blocks in
which presidents and prime ministers live and work, and that until not so long
ago were open to pedestrian and vehicular traffic, are being sealed off and
turned into fortresses; their protection is entrusted to uniformed and, especially,
nonuniformed personnel with every imaginable technological device ready to
hand. From Sweden to Israel, leaders who once walked the streets freely and
without escorts have long since ceased doing so. They are now seen by the public,
if at all, only when they are whisked from one place to another in their curtained,
heavily armored limousines; the places they are expected to visit are routinely
sealed off and searched, sometimes for days or weeks before the event. It is the
kind of security of which a Cesare Borgia might have been proud—and that not
long ago was considered necessary only to protect the world’s worst dictators.
So far, those measures seem to have done little to eliminate the problem.
What they have done is turn private security into a growth industry par excel-
lence worldwide.36 Thus, in Germany the years from 1984 to 1996 saw the num-
ber of private security firms more than double (from 620 to 1,400), while
employment in that field increased by 300 percent.37 In Britain, the number of
security employees rose from ten thousand in 1950 to 250,000 in 1976;38 since
growth has continued thereafter, the number of private guards must have ex-
ceeded that of the state’s uniformed, active troops (237,000 in 1995) years ago.
(As for developing countries, in many of them the internal threat is such that
armed forces have never been able to turn their attention exclusively outward in
the first place.) In the United States, as of 1972 the private security industry had
almost twice as many employees, and 1.5 times the budget, of all local, state, and
federal police forces combined.39 Its turnover stood at fifty-two million dollars a
year and was expected to double by the end of the century.40 If present trends per-
sist, the day is in sight when American citizens will pay more for private security
than for their country’s armed forces; the ratio between the two, which in 1972
stood at 1:7, has since declined to 1:5 and is still going down. The number of em-
ployees in the field, about 1,600,000, already exceeds that of uniformed troops.
Clearly, the impact of these developments differs sharply from one place to
another, and some places remain much safer than others. Still, the prospect is
that the use of armed violence—which since at least Thomas Hobbes has been
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recognized as the most important function of the state—will again be shared
out among other entities, as it was during the Middle Ages.41 This is already the
subject of science fiction, as well as computer games.42 Some entities will be ter-
ritorial but not sovereign—that is, communities larger than states; others, per-
haps more numerous, will be neither sovereign nor territorial. Some will operate
in the name of political, ideological, religious, or ethnic objectives, others with
an eye purely to private gain.
In many so-called “developing countries,” the situation just described already
exists and indeed always has. Whether acting on their own—mounting private
guards, even setting up entire armies—or by forming agreements with local in-
surgents, people and corporations are trying to safeguard their property and
their operations; it is a situation often known as neocolonialism.43
It is true that most citizens of most advanced countries are still able to sleep
safely in their beds, but their beds are increasingly likely to be protected by weap-
ons and surrounded by walls. In Britain alone, there are probably some two mil-
lion illegal firearms.44 As of 1997 the United States had some two hundred
million firearms in circulation, as well as thirty thousand gated communities,
which latter number was expected to double in a few years. Not surprisingly,
there is already some evidence that the residents of these communities are disen-
gaging from public affairs.45 Both for them and for their less fortunate country-
men, future life will likely become less secure, or at any rate more obsessed with
security, than the life that was provided by the most powerful states of the past.
On the positive side, as we have seen, those same states are much less likely to
engage each other in major hostilities—let alone in warfare on a global
scale—than was the case until 1945. The bargain that was struck in the seven-
teenth century, in which the state offered its citizens much-improved day-to-day
security in return for their willingness to sacrifice themselves on its behalf if
called upon, may be coming to an end. Nor, considering that the number of
those who died during the six years of World War II stood at approximately
thirty thousand people per day, is its demise necessarily to be lamented.
THE FUTURE
The implications of everything we have said so far are perfectly clear. Con-
fronted with its own supreme product, nuclear weapons, large-scale interstate
war as a phenomenon is slowly but surely being squeezed below the historical
horizon. To be sure, the process has been neither easy nor smooth. Since 1945,
even in regions and between countries where nuclear weapons made their pres-
ence felt, there have been plenty of crises and scares. Nor should one overlook
the wars between nonnuclear states, which, as in the Middle East and South Asia,
went on fighting to their hearts’ content.
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By 1970, if not before, it had become clear that any state capable of building
modern conventional armed forces—of operating, say, a number of armored di-
visions or maintaining a flotilla of major warships—would also be capable of
developing a nuclear program. Indeed, to judge by the experience of some coun-
tries (such as China, India, Pakistan, and, of course, Israel), building nuclear
weapons is actually easier than producing some advanced conventional ones. Is-
rael, according to the most recent accounts, appears to have built its first nuclear
weapon in 1967.46 It was a decade later, however, before Israel unveiled its first
tank, the Merkava I, and even then 60 percent of its parts had to be imported.
From then until the present day, Israel has not produced a first-line fighter air-
craft, and its latest missile boats are being built in American shipyards.
While interstate war was going down, intrastate war was going up. Literally
entire continents, hundreds of millions if not billions of people, found them-
selves living under different regimes as a direct result of such wars. Judging by
this criterion—which, being political, is the only one that is in some sense “cor-
rect”—the difference between the two kinds of war can only be called
monumental.
When the last colonies—those of Portugal—went free in 1975, many people
felt that an era in warfare had come to an end.47 Having suffered one defeat after
another, the most important armed forces of the “developed” world in particu-
lar heaved a sigh of relief; gratefully, they felt that they could return to “ordi-
nary” soldiering, by which they meant preparing for wars against armed
organizations similar to themselves on the other side of the Iron Curtain. In fact,
however, the hoped-for respite did not materialize. At the time these lines are be-
ing written, of the wars in progress, all, without a single exception, are being
fought inside states, and none is fought between states on both sides. Though most
continue to take place in what used to be called the third world, some are unfolding
in the former second one; nor is the soi-disant first world necessarily immune.
Since any country capable of building even moderately advanced conven-
tional weapons should be capable of building nuclear weapons, and since expe-
rience has shown that conventional armed forces and their weapons are only
marginally useful in intrastate conflicts, it is no wonder that those weapons and
armed forces are being squeezed out. This process does not apply to the same ex-
tent around the world, nor are the three principal armed services affected to an
equal degree. From one country to another, much depends on geographical situ-
ations, perceived threats, strategic plans, etc. In each of the three services, it is
probably the heaviest weapons and systems that will be the first to go; according
to a recent article in The Economist, during the years since 1990 the global mar-
ket for them has declined by no less than 44 percent.48
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According to the same article, however, “with some 30 small wars constantly
on the boil, demand for light weapons has rattled on like a vintage Gatling gun.”
Many of them are copies of models first introduced by such leading arms pro-
ducers as the United States, the USSR, and Israel; they are being produced in
such out-of-the-way places as Pakistan and Croatia. They range from hand gre-
nades and submachine guns through mortars and heavy machine guns, all the way
to armored cars and personnel carriers. Equally brisk is the trade in devices that
are used in antiterrorist operations, such as security fences and metal detectors.
To sum up, the roughly three-hundred-year period in which war was associ-
ated primarily with the type of political organization known as the state—first
in Europe, and then, with its expansion, in other parts of the globe as
well—seems to be coming to an end. If the last fifty years or so provide any
guide, future wars will be overwhelmingly of the type known, however inaccu-
rately, as “low intensity.” Both organizationally and in terms of the equipment at
their disposal, the armed forces of the world will have to adjust themselves to
this situation by changing their doctrine, doing away with much of their heavy
equipment and becoming more like the police. In many places that process is al-
ready well under way.
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